Moby Media Updates Archives 2008 MMU: The obstacles facing Nato in Afghanistan, 22 June 2008
| MMU: The obstacles facing Nato in Afghanistan, 22 June 2008 |
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You can now see what the fuss is all about. The obstacles facing Nato in Afghanistan
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FEATURE STORY
Telegraph.co.uk, United Kingdom These are the main problems Nato is confronted with in war-torn Afghanistan: DRUGS Afghanistan is now almost the world's sole producer of illicit opium, and most of it comes from Helmand. On British streets, that means cheap heroin. In southern Afghanistan, it means warlords with bloated opium profits, a spiralling addiction problem, and an opportunity for Taliban gunmen to recruit angry farmers. The Taliban's version of a hearts-and-minds programme is to offer protection to farmers' opium crops from government eradicators, for a 10 per cent "tax", which is usually paid willingly. British troops, who patrol through beautiful fields of opium poppies, are only too aware of the scale of the problem. Afghan farmers in the pretty villages around towns like Musa Qala, retaken from the Taliban last year, fear that the British will destroy their livelihood - and they will continue to fear that until they can make a good living from some other crop. So far, the "alternative livelihoods" programmes promoted by the Department for International Development have been extremely disappointing in persuading farmers to switch from opium to new crops. Meanwhile, opium will continue to fuel the war. Taliban weapons, ammunition and fighters are paid for by drugs lords who don't want the Afghan government authority that, in theory at least, comes in the Army's wake. For all the counter-narcotics efforts in Kabul and the stern words in Whitehall about tackling drugs, British soldiers understand the drugs problem very well. This spring, as eradication teams made ready in Kandahar, the British were broadcasting radio adverts promising not to destroy opium around Musa Qala. Not this year, at least. CORRUPTION There is one gripe above all in both the embassies of Kabul and the teahouses of Lashkar Gah: corruption. The shiny, four-wheel drive cars and the gaudy mansions that have sprouted in the cities must be paid for somehow, Afghans tell each other as they ask what has happened to the billions of dollars of reconstruction money from Western donors. Then there is the frightening corruption from vast drugs profits, which enriches warlords who were on the ropes when America invaded, but who now wield real power. In shabby government offices, heated through a freezing Kabul winter by one-bar electric fires, the temptation to take a bribe must be considerable. Whatever the truth, the perception of corruption has eaten away at the high hopes of seven years ago. Afghans must ask themselves why they should go to the effort of honestly building their nation when they are convinced that their leaders are simply interested in stealing to feather their nests, or in this case, their luxury apartments, a short flight away in Dubai. President Hamid Karzai is one of the few leaders not tainted by claims of personal corruption, and as yet it is too early to call Afghanistan a narco-state. It may yet avoid that fate. But since 2001, no senior figures have been arrested for corruption, and with a population growing ever more cynical, and foreign backers ever more exasperated, this is the problem that the Kabul government simply must tackle. So far they have shown little ability or willingness to do so. CRIMINALITY Afghan drivers bringing supplies to British bases in Helmand get used to being stopped by gunmen demanding money with menaces at dozens of checkpoints. The gunmen are police. They are badly armed, poorly trained, and sent to dangerous, lonely checkpoints where they rarely receive wages. To make up for it they shake down drivers. The drivers must run a gauntlet of bandits, who are less likely to kill them than Taliban guerrillas - although some drivers believe that the gunmen are police by day, guerrillas by night, and robbers all the time. Merchants in Kandahar talk whimsically about the harsh days of Taliban rule before 2001 when bandits were hanged in market places and there was little risk of hijacking. In the cities, it is kidnappers who are feared by anybody capable of paying a ransom. Schoolchildren are snatched on the way to classes. Businessmen complain to each other over cups of green tea: what is the point of being successful and attracting kidnappers? With crime out of control, reconstruction slows to a halt, trust in the government vanishes and a demoralising fear takes hold. And fairly or not, it is Western armies - the powerful forces which drove out the Taliban in 2001 - that are blamed. IGNORANCE On patrol with British soldiers in the mountain villages of northern Kandahar province, a little drama is routinely played out. First, guns ready and perhaps helicopter gunships buzzing overhead, compounds are searched for guerrillas or for hidden weapons. Then, as the adrenaline wears off, village elders are invited to sit in a circle, stroking their beards and sipping tea, to listen as an earnest young captain explains the benefits the Afghan government will bring - medicine, electricity, education. After a while, the eldest villager will rise, usually tottering, and say that those things are all very well, but the village just wants to be left alone. The presence of the British is sure to attract the Taliban - and then there will be fighting, bombing, and deaths. Many such villages - there are hundreds across the mountains and deserts of the south - are surprisingly welcoming when the British arrive, offering raisins and tea to squaddies and complaining about Taliban fighters who will kill them if they are not fed and sheltered. The chief concern of villagers, however, is not democracy or progress, but survival, and they know the British patrols will soon leave and the Taliban will be back. In the cities, the modernisation project has far more chance of success, but unlike Iraq, with its educated middle class, there is a desperate shortage of skilled workers. Hospitals lack doctors, entrepreneurs are rare, and the government cannot find enough intelligent, experienced civil servants, especially for the dangerous provinces. Afghans, even in remote villages, are sick of the medieval conditions they have had to endure for decades. But for a nation devastated by 30 years of war, traumatised by its experience and denuded of talented people, modernising is not proving easy.
BUSINESS Afghan roads kill or wound five people a day
http://www.quqnoos.com/ About 430 people killed or wounded in last three months, traffic head says TRAFFIC accidents killed or wounded about five people every day in Afghanistan in the last three months - most of them drug addicts -, according to the country's traffic chief. Afghanistan's head of traffic, Nooridin Hamdard, failed to give the precise number of people killed in traffic accidents since mid-March, but he said more than 430 people had been killed or wounded on the road since then. Drug abuse while driving, lack of road awareness and poor roads are among the reasons for the high number of accidents in Afghanistan, Hamdard said. The government's traffic department says accidents have decreased by 20% so far this year compared to the same period last year. Head of the children's department of the Indira Gandhi hospital, Dr Khalillulah Hodkhel, said only five out of the 132 child car crash victims had died in the hospital in the last two and a half months. Hamdard said people must co-operate with traffic police. "It is not possible to employ traffic police at the gates of every school to protect the children, but we teach pupils the laws of the road in 36 schools in the capital," he said. He said the government planned to publish books on traffic laws for schoolchildren to read. Driving in Afghanistan without a license is an offence punishable by 6 months in prison and a cash fine. Drink drivers face up to six years in jail. Habibullah, a Kabuli driver, said: "When the children go to cross the streets, they are never careful and they run on the roads without looking. This causes most of the traffic accidents." Hamdard urged mothers and fathers to accompany children on their way to school to reduce the number of traffic accidents. New classified US documents reveal that mass infiltration of Frontier Corps by Afghan insurgents is helping latest offensive
The Raw Story The Pakistani Frontier Corps has been heavily infiltrated and influenced by Taliban militants, sometimes joining in attacks on coalition forces, according to classified US 'after-action' reports compiled following clashes on the border. According to those familiar with the material, regarded as deeply sensitive by the Pentagon in view of America's fragile relationship with Pakistan, there are 'box loads' of such reports at US bases along the length of the Pakistan-Afghan border. Details of the level of infiltration emerged yesterday on a day when five more US-led soldiers were killed in southern Afghanistan. Four of the soldiers died in a bomb and gunfire attack outside the southern city of Kandahar. Nato officials have reported a dramatic increase in cross-border incidents compared with the same period last year. The US documents describe the direct involvement of Frontier Corps troops in attacks on the Afghan National Army and coalition forces, and also detail attacks launched so close to Frontier Corps outposts that Pakistani co-operation with the Taliban is assumed. 'The reality,' said a source familiar with the situation on the ground, 'is that there are units so opposed to what the coalition is doing and so friendly to the other side that when the opportunity comes up they will fire on Afghan and coalition troops. And this is not random. It can be exceptionally well co-ordinated.' Another source - who has seen the reporting - described an attack last year where two Frontier Corps outposts appear to have been directly involved in firing on Afghan forces before a militant attack. Frontier Corps personnel have in the past been implicated in the past in murdering US and Afghan officers. In the most high-profile case, a Frontier Corps member 'assassinated' Major Larry J Bauguess during a border mediation meeting. In another incident, an Afghan officer was killed. Since then the problem appears to have worsened as the Taliban renew their insurgency on the Afghan side of the border. 'The United States and Nato have substantial information on this problem,' said an American official. 'It's taking place at a variety of places along the border with the Frontier Corps giving direct and indirect assistance. I'm not saying it is everyone. There are some parts that have been quite helpful... but if you have seen the after-action reports of their involvement in attacks along the Afghan border you would appreciate the problem.' James Appathurai, a Nato spokesman, said: 'The real concern is that the extremists in Pakistan are getting safe havens to rest, recuperate and retool in Pakistan and come across the border. The concerns have been conveyed to the Pakistan authorities.' Seth Jones, author of the Rand report, which found evidence of collaboration, said the issue had been troubling the US even before the invasion of Afghanistan: 'If you go back a decade to the Clinton administration when the US targeted militant camps, members of the Pakistani intelligence services were killed along with militants.' The allegation that senior Pakistani officials continue to offer lukewarm assistance to the coalition while offering help to the Taliban is also reiterated in Descent into Chaos, a new book by the veteran Pakistani author Ahmed Rashid. Relations between the US and Pakistan were strained this month when 11 members of the Frontier Corps were killed when the US allegedly bombed their outpost near the border town of Gora Prai during a gun battle with militants on the border. Pakistani sources have questioned why the troops were hiding in a bunker in the midst of the battle and why they were 'unaware' of an hour-long firefight going on so close by. The issue of the Taliban's ability to cross and recross the border with Pakistan into that country's Federally Administered Tribal Areas is becoming one of the most contentious issues of the war, with many - including Afghan President Hamid Karzai - insisting that his country is involved in a 'regional conflict' and threatening to send troops across the border. The death of the five soldiers yesterday came as the Taliban stepped up their offensive. It happened a day after two other US-led soldiers died in separate incidents, including a suicide bombing. Tactics in Afghanistan: right or wrong?
Telegraph.co.uk, United Kingdom There are many views on the roles coalition forces are being asked to play in Afghanistan. We hear from those inside the war-torn country as well as from concerned outside observers THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, British Ambassador in Kabul: "We are here in Afghanistan as part of a 40-nation coalition, not as an independent actor reliving the Great Game. Pulling out would hand a huge propaganda victory to Islamic extremists everywhere, not just in Afghanistan. It would mean breaking our word to the Afghan people and our partners. "The Taliban would retake the south, the warlords would come down from the north and the civil war would restart. Everything we have done here would unravel, these lands would become a haven for terrorism, and there could be millions of refugees." THE TALIBAN COMMANDER Dr Safu Rahman Danesh, a Taliban commander in central Afghanistan: "The Western forces should get out as soon as possible. We have 75 per cent of the country already. We have support. Time is not important. When the foreigners withdraw, we will decide whether or not to negotiate with the government. We will see how much the Karzai administration is working for religion and how much it is working for the prosperity of Afghanistan. This is nothing to do with foreigners. They are infidels, they are our enemy, they should leave the country. We lose men, but for us dying is winning, if we die we go to a better life. If we live, we live as heroes." THE AFGHAN TRIBAL LEADER Tribal leader from Helmand who did not want to be named: "The foreign forces are here because of the bad luck of Afghans and the disunity of Afghans. Afghans have shown that they give a teeth-breaking punch to foreigners. Now we are divided. Is there any betterment from foreigners? Do we expect anything from them, from someone with a gun? Of course not. "It is just one of the foreigners' lies that there would be civil war if they left. We are already in a civil war. All Afghans are victims now. When there is bombing by Nato forces, Afghans die. If there is a suicide bombing by Taliban, then Afghans die. The Afghans understand each other and slowly we will come to a better life. The foreigners should leave." THE SOVIET SOLDIER Vyacheslav Kuznetsov, a veteran of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan: "Afghanistan is the worst place to conduct a war. If the British want to tackle terrorism there they should send in special forces to seek out and attack specific targets. Get in fast and out fast. If the aim is to pacify Afghanistan, you will have to kill every man, woman and child. Commiting troops to a ground war in Afghanistan is doomed to failure." THE TALIBAN COMMANDER Mulla Abdul Haleem Haleem, a Taliban commander in Helmand: "These soldiers cannot bring peace but add fuel to the fire in the already volatile situation. Afghans have never liked foreigners. When it comes to British soldiers, they think they are there to settle the scores of their great-grandparents who came to occupy Afghanistan but were killed and are buried in Helmand. "Even the children consider the British to be infidels. They believe that they are there to rule, not to bring peace. There is only one solution; Nato troops led by the US should immediately announce the date of their return." THE PAKISTANI MINISTER Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao, a former Pakistan interior minister: "It would be better to engage the Taliban in a dialogue than to send more troops. Force has not worked in Afghanistan and the Taliban have shown resolve. They are capable of fighting for years. "Lack of development work has further complicated the situation. Use of sheer force was tried throughout this period and now it has not worked, another option should be tried: dialogue." THE BRITISH ARMY OFFICER A senior Army officer, who did not want to give his name: "It would be quite wrong to pull out of Afghanistan just because we have a bad week as far as casualties are concerned. Our mission is to bring security to the country and to allow reconstruction and development. "The majority of British soldiers are proud to serve in Afghanistan. There is a risk, Helmand is a dangerous place, but all of our soldiers are volunteers. They are well-trained and well-prepared for the challenges facing them. "It is often forgotten that Nato is in Afghanistan because of 9/11. Afghanistan became a training ground for the terrorists who perpetrated those attacks and the attacks which took place in London on July 7, 2005. "If Nato withdrew from Afghanistan, the country could become a haven for terrorists again. It would be wrong to think that the threat to Western society will disappear if Nato withdraws. We have a moral obligation to remain and help those Afghans who want a better life." THE WRITER Rory Stewart, a former British diplomat in Iraq and author of The Places in Between, a best-selling travelogue on Afghanistan: "Why we are in southern Afghanistan in the first place? It was about terrorism, then to fight drugs and encourage development, then to fight the Taliban. I get suspicious when the reasons keep changing, and while all these things are worthwhile we just might not be able to achieve them. "We can win battles and build roads and hold training sessions for the Afghan government, but that is very different from creating a stable and functioning nation. "I think it would be sensible to have significant troop reductions over the coming five years, although that would mean giving up on counter-narcotics or dealing with the Taliban. Counter-terrorism would have to be limited to threats that only posed a direct risk to the outside world. "We should also remember that Afghanistan is not like Iraq, it is far poorer. About 20 or 30 years of economic growth would be required to even get it looking like Bangladesh." THE FORMER AFGHAN MINISTER Ali Jalali, former Afghan interior minister: "There has been increasing violence since 2006. Since then, in the absence of an overall counter-insurgency strategy, what the international community and the Afghan government are doing is not designed to win the war, rather not to lose. "That is a major problem. There's no campaign plan, I believe. The Taliban have suffered a lot, but they can lose men. As long as they have sanctuary across the border, you can kill thousands of them. There's no military solution. You have to come up with a unified strategy. We need a unified command of all forces that can do three things: fighting, stabilising and peace-keeping." THE FORMER COMMANDER Colonel Tim Collins, the former infantry commander: "We should stay in Afghanistan but we badly need a proper mission statement. The problem is that there is no British foreign policy, so nothing to frame the mission there. We need to understand what success would look like and what we are trying to achieve there. "It is not for me to decide what the mission should be, but the first thing that needs to happen is for Gordon Brown and David Miliband to spend an hour together to form a foreign policy for the UK. Once they have that, they will be able to derive a defence policy and from that they will be able to establish what the mission should be in Afghanistan. "The Government thinks it is enough to simply say that we want the good things to happen there and the bad things to stop, to make the world a better place and make happiness be apparent. But that is not a mission. They should be talking to the Afghan government about what they aspire to do, to identify what they hope to achieve and to get time frames for it." THE SERVING SOLDIER Cpl Stephen Quinn, of the Royal Highland Fusiliers 2nd Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland in Helmand Province: "I arrived in theatre in March and am due to leave theatre in early October. At first I was tasked with assisting in mentoring the Afghan National Police in Musa Qala and I have recently moved on to Battle Group South Headquarters in Lashkar Gah, to work as an infantry signaller. "The mission in Afghanistan is going well. Despite the Taliban stepping up their attacks on ISAF, American troops with the assistance of Battle Group South have pushed further south than any ISAF troops have been before. We are here to help rebuild Afghanistan and deny terrorists a safe haven, which I believe is a very worthwhile cause. "The British public has been very supportive of our mission, the media coverage in Afghanistan is enough to give them a good idea of what is going on and why we are here. Everywhere you turn there are messages of support and parcels labelled: 'To a British Soldier'. All the guys really appreciate the things people send as it can be hard to get certain things out here, particularly in Forward Operations Bases. "The mission in Afghanistan is justified, we are here by invitation of the government of Afghanistan, every soldier who comes here puts him or herself at risk, but they do so knowing that what they are doing is the right thing to do. It won't be over soon and everyone here understands it is an enduring operation, but we are all committed and when it is over this will be a better place to live." THE SECURITY EXPERT Dr Paul Cornish, head of the international security programme at foreign policy think tank Chatham House, said: "I think the British mission in southern Afghanistan it is worth it. For all the pain and talk of overstretch, you have to see it within the overall context of Afghanistan's development. "Things may not be going perfectly, but I think it is getting to the point where you can see momentum in terms of key development factors, like the numbers of children going into education, access to health services, the spread of the media and so on. There are signs of positive returns." THE SHADOW MINISTER William Hague, shadow foreign secretary: "In Afghanistan we are engaged in a fight against terrorism and extremism which is a threat to us all and 106 of our finest men and women have given their lives for this cause. "It is common ground in Britain that to achieve a stable Afghanistan we must ensure that those who are fighting and winning these battles have the equipment they need; that other Nato countries take on a greater share of the burden; and that the restrictions imposed by other countries on the way their troops are used are removed. And of great importance, the creation of a viable state is not going to succeed without a sustained effort led by the Afghan president Karzai's government to root out corruption. "Eventual success will depend on all of the above, and will take time. But an urgent reform needed without delay is a complete unity of military command. "Very few military campaigns in history have been won without a unified command." THE DEMOCRAT Barack Obama, Democratic presidential candidate: "Afghanistan is sliding towards chaos and risks turning into a narco-terrorist state. We need to take more resources and put them into the country. I've called for at least two additional combat brigades to support our efforts there. I've also called for at least $1 billion in non-military assistance each year. "We've got an opportunity to mount a transatlantic surge in diplomacy, where our Nato allies feel more confident in our overarching strategy, feel that they're being listened to, and may be willing to re-engage or engage further in Afghanistan in a way that right now they're resistant to. They're still frustrated about what's happened in Iraq and still suspicious about US motives." THE REPUBLICAN John McCain, Republican presidential candidate: "The Taliban's recent resurgence threatens to lead Afghanistan to revert to its pre-9/11 role as a sanctuary for terrorists with global reach. "Our recommitment to Afghanistan must include increasing Nato forces, suspending the debilitating restrictions on when and how those forces can fight, expanding the training and equipping of the Afghan National Army through a long-term partnership with Nato to make it more professional and multi-ethnic, and deploying significantly more foreign police trainers. It must also address the current political deficiencies in judicial reform, reconstruction, governance, and anti-corruption efforts." THE SOLDIER Pte Hamilton, 5th Batallion, Royal Regiment of Scotland 'What we are doing here is worthwhile. It will take time but as soldiers we understand sometimes you take one step forward and two steps back. That is the nature of our job. The local people do appreciate the security we give them and to see a new school, a mosque and a health centre in this area is proving popular' Reports by: Nick Meo, Sean Rayment, Massoud Ansari, Colin Freeman, Tim Shipman, Jasper Copping, Angus McDowall, Nick Holdsworth Police round-up 200 young truants
http://www.quqnoos.com/ Parents complain children hang out in snooker halls instead of school POLICE in Kabul have rounded up and arrested 200 young people for anti-social behaviour and truancy. Many of the young people arrested were school students accused of playing computer games and hanging out in snooker clubs instead of attending class. Head of the criminal investigation department in Kabul, Ali Shah Paktiawal, said the young people are also suspected of bullying and harassing Kabul's citizens on the capital's streets. Police shut down about 40 illegal snooker and video game halls in the last few days. This is the third time in the last six months that police have rounded-up young boys and school students from the clubs. Many families in Kabul are worried that their children are failing to attend school because they go to the clubs to meet up with friends. General Sir Michael Jackson: We must maintain our will in Afghanistan
Telegraph.co.uk, United Kingdom Have Your Say General Sir Michael Jackson says that we must remember why we are in Afghanistan - to protect the world from terrorism The recent tragic deaths of British soldiers in Afghanistan - including the first woman to be killed there - together with the announcement of the modest increase to the British military contingent by about 200 have sharpened the public focus on our operations in that country. The question "is it worth it" is being asked more loudly. Why is the UN, Nato and the coalition in Afghanistan? In the immediate aftermath of the horrific attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, it became clear that the al-Qa'eda perpetrators - mostly of Saudi origin - had trained and prepared themselves in Afghanistan. It was also clear that the then Taliban regime had at least acquiesced in, even actively encouraged, these preparations. Paradoxically, the Taliban had its origins in the Afghan resistance to the Soviet occupation of the 1980s. The coalition rapidly took military action to remove that regime, which had also treated many Afghans abominably. Much of the fighting on the ground was conducted by Afghans themselves. The Taliban was swiftly defeated - but it was not completely destroyed, and the survivors sought sanctuary across the Pakistan border. The Bonn Conference of December 2001 laid out a constitutional, electoral and judicial road-map for Afghanistan's future, and established an International Security Force (ISAF) to assist with security initially in and around Kabul. Arrangements for non-military assistance and reconstruction were also put in place. These measures were given UN authority by virtue of Security Council Resolution 1386. The coalition main effort then switched to Saddam Hussein and Iraq; inevitably this meant that the eye was taken off the Afghan ball. But by late 2005 it had become clear that more needed to be done, not least in expanding ISAF's area of operations to include the country as a whole. he UN agreed that Nato would act on its behalf, with the coalition forces engaged on counter-terrorist operations eventually integrating with ISAF into a single command structure. The United Kingdom offered to take, and was given, operational responsibility for Helmand Province. The first substantial British deployment to this major poppy-growing province of southern Afghanistan took place in the early summer of 2006; not surprisingly, this deployment was resisted by re-formed Taliban forces crossing into Afghanistan from Pakistan. For the Taliban, the concept of a free and democratic Afghanistan was anathema; it would, given the chance, re-impose its despotic rule over the Afghan people. There was fierce fighting, of a largely conventional nature; the Taliban lost every tactical battle. As the campaign has progressed over the past two years, the Taliban has realised that it cannot defeat the British Army and its coalition partners in conventional manoeuvres; it has accordingly turned towards unconventional, asymmetric tactics - in particular, the use of improvised explosive devices. Such tactics cannot defeat Nato forces militarily; the Taliban no doubt seeks to defeat our will to succeed. So much for the narrative of how we got to where we are now. But we must be clear about our strategic purpose: to prevent Afghanistan reverting to being a training centre for global terrorism. As with other interventions, it is to help a country move from some dark past to a better future. It is to achieve a country that is stable, at peace with itself and its neighbours, with a representative government, institutions becoming embedded, effective security forces, refugees returned home, reconstruction and economic regeneration in progress, all underpinned by the rule of law. This is a complex and difficult challenge in Afghanistan, as it is elsewhere - and it will take time. We should remember in this context that healing past wounds and rebuilding a country can be a lengthy process: the British Armed Forces were deployed in aid of the civil power in Northern Ireland for nearly 38 years; there is still an international military presence in Bosnia after 16 years, in Kosovo after nine years (where there is still not a universally accepted settlement); and while the circumstances are very different from those of Afghanistan, there is still considerable work for the coalition to do in Iraq. Our opponents are, in all probability, of the view that the West has not got the stomach for a long campaign - we must have the strategic endurance to more than match them. If we were not to do so, I believe that the Taliban would again impose itself by violence on Afghanistan; we would be back to square one, or worse, with the Taliban harbouring international terrorists and imposing terror internally. We must not allow this to happen, and so we must maintain our will and accept the cost in blood and treasure, remembering that risk-free soldiering is a contradiction in terms. The question of when the campaign will successfully conclude is not, therefore, one of dates, but one of achieving the right conditions for Afghanistan to stand alone without international assistance. It is of strategic importance that the international community holds its nerve, with Pakistan having a particularly crucial role in handling terrorism in that country. Pakistan walks a difficult tightrope between moderate and immoderate - extreme - Islam. While the former should be applauded, the latter harbours extremism. I have little doubt that al-Qa'eda represents as much a long-term threat to Pakistan as it does elsewhere. Poppy cultivation is a difficult additional dimension of the campaign, with the UK as lead nation for counter-narcotics. There are a number of paradoxes: the vast majority of heroin illegally consumed in this country and internationally originates from the Afghan poppy fields; poppy cultivation is illegal under Afghan law; there is a world-wide shortage of opiates for medical use; the poppy is far more valuable to the farmers of southern Afghanistan as a cash crop than any other. Over time, a long-term solution to these paradoxes must be found; in the short term, the effect of counter-narcotic operations on Afghan hearts and minds must be very carefully weighed. It is a mistake to see all of this through purely British eyes focused on Helmand Province. There is a very large multinational effort - civilian and military - being made throughout the country to achieve a stable Afghanistan. Much of the country is relatively peaceful; most of the violence takes place in the south-east. There are considerable reconstruction successes, and the fact that about five million refugees have returned to their homes sends its own message. The campaign in Afghanistan demands great commitment and considerable risk-taking by all concerned - obviously by the Afghans themselves, but also on the part of the wider world. We must understand that it will take time, and we must have the will to achieve what we have set out to do. It follows that we must, therefore, be willing to provide the means required. I close these thoughts by paying tribute to the British Armed Forces whose professionalism and courage are such an example to us all. While we mourn the loss of brave people, let us remember that, as with many past and current operations, our Armed Forces are making a real difference for the greater and wider good in Afghanistan. Their selfless commitment on the nation's behalf deserves to be given the fullest recognition and support.
Dawn Tension gripped Miramshah in N. Waziristan on Saturday after clashes broke out between Nato forces and the Taliban in Afghanistan near the Pakistan border. Sources said the gunbattle took place near the Ghulam Khan checkpost and the area reverberated with loud explosions. They said that artillery shells had landed near the mutual territory which triggered fear among area people.-Correspondent AFP adds: A spokesman for the Nato-led forces in Kabul said that one of its bases and a local army compound had been attacked from across the border with Pakistan. Russia may send weapons to Afghan army
Written by http://www.quqnoos.com/ foreign desk Deal with US may see the bear's arms reach once more into Afghanistan AMERICA and Russia have signed a deal that may see Russian arms supplied to the Afghan National Army (ANA), senior diplomats said. The deal, which follows Russia's recent decision to allow NATO to transport supplies to its forces in Afghanistan, was agreed in Moscow during a meeting of the United States Russia Working Group on Counter-terrorism (CTWG). "An agreement in principle to provide Russian military material to the Afghanistan National Army," was concluded during a two-day meeting of the CTWG, diplomats said in a statement. The amount or type of weapons Russia may supply to the ANA is not clear yet. Russia, as part of the then Soviet Union, fought an 11-year war in Afghanistan from 1978 to 1989, when its soldiers retreated in the face of a growing insurgency. Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak said: "We in the past have already provided military equipment to Afghanistan and we feel there is now a demand by the Afghan population and the ability of Afghanistan to take its security in its own hands." He said it was "possible" Russia may increase the delivery of arms to Afghanistan. "It is possible but I would not be eager to put a number on it," he said. Bombings kill 5 foreign soldiers in Afghanistan
The Washington Times - World Roadside bombs killed five foreign troops and five government soldiers Saturday as part of a surge of violence that has made Afghanistan's battlefields deadlier for foreign forces than those in Iraq. The U.S. administration already has highlighted the Iraq-Afghan comparison to lobby its NATO allies - with limited success - to commit more forces to Afghanistan for a conflict likely to test the West's stomach for a long, grinding war. Violence continues unabated despite the more than 60,000 foreign troops in the country and fresh pledges of financial aid to President Hamid Karzai's struggling government. Last year, more than 8,000 people were killed in insurgency-related attacks - the most since the 2001 U.S.-led invasion - and violence has claimed more than 1,700 lives so far this year. Marvin Weinbaum, a former State Department official and now an Afghanistan specialist at the Washington-based Middle East Institute, said the rising casualties would sharpen the focus on Afghanistan in the U.S. presidential race. "What's being brought home is the nature of the conflict. It's in the true fashion of a guerrilla operation and we're not prepared for it," Mr. Weinbaum said. In Saturday's deadliest incident, a roadside bomb hit a coalition convoy west of the main southern city of Kandahar, killing four troops and wounding two others. Coalition spokesman Lt. Col. Paul Fanning said gunmen opened fire on the damaged vehicles and three Afghans also were hurt. He declined to release the nationality of the troops, who were involved in training Afghan forces. To the east, a Polish soldier from the separate NATO-led force died when a bomb hit his patrol after midnight in Paktika province. Jacek Poplawski, a Polish military spokesman in Warsaw, said four other soldiers were wounded. In separate incidents, attackers detonated bombs and opened fire on vehicles carrying Afghan troops in Zabul and Kunar provinces, killing five soldiers and wounding three. The bombings capped a bloody week. NATO and Afghan troops backed by warplanes on Wednesday attacked up to 400 Taliban militants who had seized the strategic Arghandab valley, within striking distance of Kandahar. Lt. Gen. Sher Mohammad Karimi, chief of operations for the Afghan Defense Ministry, said Afghan troops had counted the bodies of 94 insurgents and were holding 29 suspects. About three-quarters of the militants were foreigners, and villagers said they heard them speaking Arabic and Urdu, the main language of Pakistan, Gen. Karimi told reporters in Kabul. NATO has sought to play down the threat to Kandahar, the Taliban's former capital, and urged citizens not to panic. A total of 31 foreign troops have died this month, including four British soldiers, four American troops and another member of the U.S.-led coalition killed earlier this week, according to an Associated Press tally. cAssociated Press writers Rahim Faiez in Kabul, Noor Khan in Kandahar, and Vanessa Gera in Warsaw, Poland contributed to this report. US officials 'despair' at Nato allies' failings in Afghanistan
Telegraph.co.uk - UK American officials are in a state of near despair about the failure of Britain's European allies to do more to beef up Nato combat power in Afghanistan. A Pentagon adviser told The Telegraph that US commanders wish they had never agreed to Nato taking charge of major combat operations against the Taliban in the lawless south of the country. They believe that different military rules of engagement and different approaches to reconstruction have made it impossible to devise a unified strategy for fighting and nation building, leaving the way open for the resurgence of the Taliban. There is still a division of responsibility in Afghanistan between forces operating under Nato's International Security Assistance Force and those that are part of the US's Operation Enduring Freedom, the original US military operation in Afghanistan. The Pentagon consultant pointed to the different national rules which mean that troops from several Nato allies like Germany are banned from conducting offensive military operations, or conducting patrols at night. The adviser said: "There's frustration, there's irritation. The mood veers between acceptance and despair that nothing is changing. We ask for more troops and they're not forthcoming in the numbers we need. "The mistake was handing it over to Nato in the first place. For many countries being in Afghanistan seems to be about keeping up appearances, rather than actually fighting a war that needs to be won. "Was that necessary diplomatically? Probably. Is it desirable militarily? I don't think so and nor do most others who are involved with Afghanistan," he said. The consultant, who advises the Pentagon on security coordination with the Afghan military, said American ire is not directed at the British, who are "doing what they can". Ali Jalali, the Afghan interior minister between 2003 and 2005 endorsed that view that the Taliban can only be defeated and marginalised from Afghan life if there is a new strategy and a unified military command. In an interview with The Telegraph he said: "In the absence of an overall counterinsurgency strategy, what the international community and the Afghan government are doing is not designed to win the war, rather not to lose. "That is a major problem. There's no campaign plan. We need a unified command of all forces that can do three things: fighting, stabilising and peacekeeping. Unless you speak with one voice it is not going to work. We need more troops to stabilise the country." Mr Jalali, who now has a post at the US National Defence University and is an influential voice on the conflict in Washington, warned that unless the allies adopt a new strategy "the Taliban could establish sanctuaries in Afghanistan" as well as across the border in Pakistan, where they already train for action back home. And he warned that instead of building up the Afghan armed forces, the Afghan government is so worried about the need to placate local warlords ahead of elections later this year that they are "tolerating those who are not interested in stability". He cited a damning report published last week by the US Government Accountability Office which detailed how even after $16bn of investment, just two out of 105 Afghan army units are ready to fight and not one single police unit is fit for purpose. Mr Jalali says the nation building efforts are also shackled by a lack of international cooperation, with different governments doing different things in different parts of the country. He said: "That creates a lot of problems. You have four countries, one builds a clinic, one supplies ambulances, another medical equipment and another training but they do it in four different provinces. They need to coordinate. Someone has to own it." In an appearance with senior members of his foreign policy team last week, the Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama admitted that many European nations are "resistant" to helping more in Afghanistan because they lack confidence "in our overarching strategy". But even among countries like Britain, the US, Canada and the Netherlands who are bearing the brunt of the fighting, there are stark differences over tactics and strategy for engaging with the Taliban. So sensitive are the British government to the charge that they are talking to the Taliban when they should be killing them, that a delegation of around 10 British military officers recently travelled to Washington to meet members of conservative think tanks, many of whom advise the Pentagon and White House on Middle Eastern affairs. The effort to reach out does not appear to have worked perfectly. One of those present said: "They made the case strongly that there is no military solution and that you don't win a counterinsurgency just by killing the enemy. They were highly sensitive to any criticism. They seemed keen to blame the Afghan government for things that are going wrong." Rebels fire rockets at NATO and UN bases
http://www.quqnoos.com/ NATO-led force says rockets landed 3km from its base in Khost REBELS have launched rockets at a United Nations office and a NATO base, officials said. The Taliban claimed the attack on ISAF's Khost base on Friday inflicted huge casualties on the foreign soldiers stationed there, but the NATO-led force said the rockets landed 3km from the base. The attack destroyed a residential house, killing an elderly man and wounding four more, a domestic news agency said. About 12 rockets hit offices belonging to the UN's Assistance Mission in Afghanistan in Herat's Guzra district, a police spokesman in the province said. Colonel Abdul Rauf Ahmadi said no one was killed or wounded in the attack. Warlord: My encounter with Taliban mastermind Backed by the CIA, he fought the Soviets then was sidelined. Now he's back, wreaking havoc among British forces. Raymond Whitaker on meeting Jalaluddin Haqqani
Independent, UK In a month when Britain has lost nine soldiers in Afghanistan, including the first woman, and hundreds of Taliban fighters were freed by a daring bomb attack on Kandahar's main jail, the British public is only just becoming aware of the malevolent power of Jalaluddin Haqqani. A man once known only to old Afghan hands is being credited with the resurgence of the Taliban since 2006. He is said to have introduced Iraqi-style suicide bombings to a country where they were unknown and are still considered by many to be un-Islamic. Wily and well connected, he is emerging as the biggest threat to Britain and its Nato allies in Afghanistan, where last month more Western troops were killed than in Iraq for the first time since 2003. He has experienced a comeback as spectacular as that of the movement he is now serving as principal military commander. When I encountered Haqqani in March 1994, the fortunes of the legendary Afghan warlord were at a low ebb. He was a hero to the CIA and wealthy Arab backers during the fight against the Soviet invaders. As chronicled in the movie Charlie Wilson's War, torrents of money and arms had been channelled through Pakistan's intelligence service to resistance leaders like him. But, after the Russians pulled out in 1989 and the Communist regime collapsed in 1992, Haqqani and his fellow Pashtun chieftains had been outmanoeuvred. Kabul had been seized by the Tajik commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, who installed his party leader, Burhanuddin Rabbani, as President. Now Haqqani was sitting outside the President's office, waiting for an audience in which he would seek favours, and the photograph I took of him shows all the discomfort of a man who would have preferred to be meeting Rabbani on the battlefield. Already in his late 40s, the mujahedin commander might have been expected to fade into obscurity, especially when Pakistan despaired of his ilk and decided to foster the Taliban instead. Yet 14 years later, he is regarded as the Taliban's most effective military leader. The former darling of the West's intelligence agencies is now their leading target after Osama bin Laden, his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the Taliban figurehead, Mullah Omar. Haqqani has shown his talent for psychologically significant blows, such as the attempted assassination of President Hamid Karzai during a military parade in the heart of Kabul in April, and January's attack on a luxury hotel that killed seven and sent shivers through the expatriate community in the Afghan capital. This has accompanied the steady stream of suicide bombings that undermine Nato's military superiority and keep the civilian population on edge. On Friday, a suicide bomber on foot attacked a foreign military convoy in Helmand province, killing one Nato soldier and five civilians. How did a man now in his 60s, who appeared to have been pushed to the margins, return to such a central role? Bin Laden himself, of course, was once seen as an asset by the US, and when the wealthy Saudi decided in the 1980s to take up the Afghan cause, one of the first Afghans he met was Haqqani. From a Pashtun clan with clout both in eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal territories, Haqqani was able to provide Bin Laden with territory for his first camps. It was an association that later stood him in good stead. As one of the few Pashtun commanders able to demonstrate effectiveness in fighting the Communists - he seized Khost, the first town to fall to the mujahedin after the Soviet pullout - the rough-hewn Haqqani was admired by Arabs who dreamed of jihad but lacked the nerve to go to war themselves. He visited the Gulf states frequently, learned Arabic and was always able to raise money in the Middle East after the American tap was turned off, enabling him to maintain large numbers of men under arms. Even when Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) switched horses and backed the Taliban, he remained on good terms with the agency and was able to make a comfortable retreat to his stronghold, Miram Shah, in the Pakistani tribal area of North Waziristan. Haqqani was the first mujahedin commander to surrender unconditionally to the Taliban, and remained on polite terms with the movement. Although he was never part of the tight inner circle, he took various minor posts during Mullah Omar's five years in power, between 1996 and 2001, eventually becoming interior minister. He also helped his old associate Bin Laden to set up training camps on his return to Afghanistan. None of this necessarily meant that he was fully committed to the alliance between the Taliban and al-Qa'ida, in the view of his old contacts in the CIA and ISI - but after 9/11 it was time to put that theory to the test. According to at least one report, Haqqani was summoned to Islamabad and told he could be installed as president of Afghanistan if he formed a breakaway "moderate" faction of the Taliban, excluding Mullah Omar. Presumably, the al-Qa'ida leadership would have been expelled from Afghanistan under the deal. But the warlord declined and returned to his stronghold. According to Steve Coll, author of Ghost Wars, a history of American involvement in Afghanistan, it was into Haqqani's territory that Bin Laden fled after he managed to elude the Americans in 2001. Even then, Haqqani did not immediately assume a prominent role in the Taliban, although his forces were always ready to attack the Americans in eastern Afghanistan. It was only after the movement's 2006 spring offensive ran into trouble that he was asked to take command. The subsequent Taliban resurgence took Nato by surprise and spread dissension among its members over tactics and reinforcements. Nato insists that it cannot be defeated in battle by the Taliban. That is certainly true - large numbers of Taliban militants freed in the attack on Kandahar jail were later killed when they tried to mass together to seize the city - but it is irrelevant. With a judicious mixture of hit-and-run attacks, suicide bombings and occasional "spectaculars", plus the constant vehicle bombings that claimed four British lives last week, Haqqani can destabilise nearly half the country and hold back economic reconstruction. Recently, he appeared in a DVD to dispel rumours that he was dead, or that he had handed over to his 34-year-old son, Sirajuddin, who has assumed responsibility for military operations. He is a particularly formidable opponent for the West, with his long-standing connections to Pakistani intelligence apparently protecting him from any intervention in Waziristan, while his Middle Eastern links bring him money and recruits. "This is not a battle of haste; this is a battle of patience," he says in the DVD. He speaks from experience. The commander I saw in the President's waiting-room 14 years ago appeared to be washed up, but he has outlasted his opponents. The Taliban, formed to get rid of old warlords like him, is now grateful for his help. Nearly 100 rebels killed in Afghanistan: General
Peninsula On-line, Qatar Nearly 100 rebels including Al Qaeda-linked militants were killed in an operation near the strategic city of Kandahar this week, a top military official said yesterday, increasing an earlier toll. Authorities had said earlier that up to 56 rebels were killed in the operation against hundreds of them massing in the Arghandab district just outside the restive city after a mass jailbreak there last week. "The enemy casualties were very high," general Sher Mohammad Karimi, chief of operations for the US-trained Afghan Army - giving an update of the operation - told a news conference in Kabul. "The bodies of 94 enemies were counted by our personnel," he said, adding most of the casualties were "foreigners". He was referring to Arab and Pakistani Islamic fighters that are said to be from Al Qaeda. Two Afghan troopers were also killed, he added. The general said nearly 30 fighters captured were suspected escaped prisoners "but eight of them were captured with their guns on their shoulders and have confessed to be escaped prisoners." Karimi said his troops backed by NATO allies who have deployed thousands of troops in Afghanistan to help Kabul fight the growing insurgency were clearing the district. "There still might be some Taliban in the area hiding. A search operation is underway," he said, adding the district was likely to be declared "free-of-enemy" by Monday. The Taliban's build-up in Arghandab posed a fresh challenge to President Hamid Karzai as he seeks to tackle the bloodiest phase of an insurgency launched after the hardline movement was toppled in 2001. The militants viewed the district as a strategic stepping stone towards their goal of retaking Kandahar, the city where the movement rose to power in 1996. Karimi also said that the army knew the Taliban had plans to recapture Kandahar from Arghandab. "We had intelligence that they (Taliban) were planning an attack on Kandahar," he said, adding "We had planned an operation against them in Khakriz district before they come to Arghandab." "But the jailbreak which was a success to the Taliban changed our operational plans," he added. The Taliban are trying to topple the US-backed government of Karzai in an insurgency which has gained pace in the past two years, despite more than 70,000 foreign troops here attempting to fight the rebels back. Ghor joins opium-free club - police
Written by http://www.quqnoos.com/ Drug eradicated from western province after police destroy poppy crop THE PROVINCE of Ghor has joined Afghanistan's group of opium-free regions, according to the province's police chief. Police destroyed 100 hectares of opium crops in nine of the province's districts this year, making Ghor opium free, the police chief said on Friday. The government believes 14 provinces, including Ghor, are now opium-free and it hopes to raise this figure to 22 by the end of the year. However, many farmers in poppy-free provinces have started to grow marijuana, making Afghanistan of the largest producers of hashish in the world. More than 90% of the world's opium supply comes from Afghanistan, according to the US state department. The United Nations fears this year may see another record opium harvest, outstripping last year's bumper crop. Most opium is grown in the south, funding a Taliban insurgency that threatens security on a daily basis in the region. About 40% of the country's opium is grown in Helmand. In 2007, poppies were eradicated from about 12,300 acres of land, the Ministry of Counter-narcotics says. But farmers still cultivated a record 477,000 acres of opium last year, according to the UN. The world body said Afghanistan produced about 34% more opium last year compared to the year before. Taleban jail break wrong-footed Afghan army
The Straits Times - Latest News AFGHAN security forces knew Taleban militants were planning an offensive near the southern city of Kandahar last week but were distracted by a mass prison break, a senior army officer said on Saturday. The Taleban have seized the initiative around Kandahar in the past two weeks, freeing up to 400 comrades from the city jail, then occupying villages outside the town. Afghan and foreign troops have launched an offensive to drive them out. The Taleban had been gathering in the outlying district of Khakrez, planning to move from there to Arghandab, an area of rich orchards just 20km northwest of Kandahar city. 'We were planning to conduct an operation in Khakrez but unfortunately the incident that happened in the city changed all the programmes,' Afghan army chief of operations Lieutenant General Shir Mohammad Karim told a news conference. The incident he mentioned was one of the biggest jail breaks in modern history. A suicide truck bomber rammed the gates of Kandahar jail on June 13 and militants stormed the building, setting free up to 400 Taleban and about 700 criminals. The Afghan army, stationed 30km outside Kandahar, was told of the jail break an hour after it took place, Mr Karim said. 'By the time we got there, there was no use controlling or taking over or searching the jail because the people had gone already,' he said. Fearing a Taleban attack on Kandahar, the army began securing the city, abandoning plans to forestall the attack on Arghandab. 'Unfortunately,' said Mr Karim, the jail break 'was very successful for them. When we were busy ... securing the city of Kandahar they made use of this opportunity and moved from Khakrez to Arghandab.' On Wednesday, about 700 Afghan troops advanced across the Arghandab river under cover of a smokescreen provided by Canadian artillery and routed the Taleban's resistance . Afghan forces counted the bodies of 94 militants, Mr Karim said, adding that about 70 per cent of the insurgents were foreigners. While the battle was an important victory for the Afghan army and its Nato backers, the Taleban scored a propaganda coup with the jail break and the ease with which it occupied several villages so close to Afghanistan's second city. The Afghan army is now carrying out clearance operations around Arghandab to flush out any militants hiding there. Hundreds of villagers fled the area after Nato forces dropped leaflets warning of the impending offensive and Mr Karim said that he hoped the villagers would return on Monday. -- REUTERS Afghanistan: our allies must fight
Telegraph.co.uk - Leaders David Miliband, the Foreign Secretary, and General Sir Mike Jackson, until recently Chief of the General Staff, both writing in today's Sunday Telegraph, pose the same question: what are we doing in Afghanistan? They both answer that our armed forces are fighting to prevent the country falling back under the theocratic dictatorship of the Taliban. Had Taliban rule been merely brutal, bloody and horribly oppressive - in the way, say, that Robert Mugabe's rule is of Zimbabwe - British and American forces would almost certainly never have been sent to liberate the Afghan people from it. But as General Jackson and the Foreign Secretary point out, the Taliban leadership was instrumental in the terrorist attacks of 9/11. They provided protection and training facilities for terrorists, and gave al Qaeda a haven from which to incubate the attacks. The Taliban endorsed al-Qa'eda's war on the West. Britain, in common with every other Western nation, has a direct interest in helping the Americans ensure that Afghanistan never returns to Taliban rule. Unfortunately, very few of the other members of Nato have shown any inclination to perform their share of military service. Those who do send troops hedge their actions with so many restrictions that they cannot discharge any role effectively. That reluctance is seriously jeopardising the whole Afghan operation. As we report today, British forces are having to do far more than their fair share of fighting as a consequence of it, and it is becoming increasingly clear that the strains are having a destructive effect. More than 10,000 British soldiers are unfit for combat - not because of illness or lack of training, but because they are simply exhausted. There is a very serious need for the Nato allies of America and Britain to do what their continuing membership of the alliance implicitly promises. We hope they can quickly and effectively be shamed into contributing their fair share to protecting their own security. "Telegraph view" is written by our team of leader writers and commentators. This team includes David Hughes, Philip Johnston, Simon Heffer, Janet Daley, Con Coughlin, Robert Colvile, Iain Martin and Alex Singleton. Security round-up: five foreign soldiers die
Written by http://www.quqnoos.com/ Total number of US-led and NATO-led troops killed in two weeks reaches 17 A BOMB explosion in the southern province of Kandahar has killed four soldiers from the US-led coalition, bringing the total number of foreign troops who have lost their lives in the last two weeks to 17. Saturday's blast also wounded two US-led soldiers. A soldier from the NATO-led coalition was killed in Paktika on Saturday and four of his fellow soldiers were wounded when a bomb exploded in the province's Dila district during a routine patrol. On Friday, a suicide attack killed five civilians and wounded five more in the Greshk district of Helmand, the province's police chief said. In Khost, clashes between Taliban and US-led coalition troops on Friday left one civilian dead and three wounded, according to eye-witnesses. Also in Khost, a suicide car bomber blew himself up on Friday during an attack on an ISAF convoy in the Sabari district. No one else died in the explosion. In Farah, Afghan security forces killed eight Taliban fighters on Friday, according to the province's police chief. One policemen was killed during the clash and 20 people were arrested for helping the Taliban. Shells From Pakistan Hit Afghan Bases
ABCNEWS.com - Home Artillery shells fired from Pakistan landed in an Afghan army compound and close to an international military base in Afghanistan on Saturday and NATO forces returned fire, the alliance said. Elsewhere in Afghanistan, an improvised explosive device (IED) killed four U.S.-led coalition soldiers in the southern province of Kandahar, the scene of a large anti-Taliban offensive and an insurgent jail break. Tension has mounted between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the last week after Afghan President Hamid Karzai threatened to send troops across the frontier to hunt down Taliban militants based in Pakistan's lawless border region. "An ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) forward operating base and an Afghan National Army compound in northeastern Paktika province were attacked with indirect fire from across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border today," an ISAF statement said. No casualties were reported. Three artillery rounds landed near the ISAF base and three rounds landed inside an Afghan army compound, it said. "ISAF forces determined the origination of the rounds to be in Pakistan and returned artillery fire in self-defense." The Pakistani military was notified immediately when ISAF forces came under fire, the statement said. The armies of Pakistan, Afghanistan and ISAF maintain open channels of communication to avoid escalating any conflict. A suspected Taliban rocket also hit a hospital in the northeastern town of Asadabad close to the Pakistan border on Saturday, killing one man and wounding another man and a woman, provincial Governor Sayed Fazlullah Wahidi said. He said the rocket appeared to have been fired from across the border inside Pakistan. Taliban insurgents are able to train, equip themselves and launch attacks into Afghanistan from Pakistan's tribal belt before returning to rest and regroup, analysts say. The Taliban leadership also directs its campaign to oust the pro-Western Afghan government and drive out foreign forces from bases inside Pakistan. Pakistan denies the charges and says it has little power over its autonomous border regions. In Kandahar, two coalition soldiers were also wounded in the IED blast, a U.S. military statement said, without giving further details. The Taliban have upped pressure on Kandahar in the past two weeks, freeing at least 300 of their comrades in the jail break, then occupying areas outside the town, forcing Afghan and foreign troops to launch a large offensive to clear them out. In another incident, an IED killed a Polish soldier from the ISAF and wounded four more on Saturday in Paktika province, the Polish news agency (PAP) said. (Writing by Jon Hemming; Editing by Janet Lawrence) Alan Watkins: Why not have a by-election on Afghanistan? Mr Davis has made a stand on the 42-day detention limit. A war we are fighting at the behest of the United States is just as important
Independent, UK Truly, our system of government is a wonderful thing. The ratification of a treaty can go through virtually on the nod, as it did in the House of Lords last week over the Treaty of Lisbon. Another topic which was hotly debated in the Commons - the 42-day detention period - is, by contrast, the subject of a by-election, even though the parties divided on party lines. There is a third kind of question: where the parties choose to agree with one another and to keep the public, as far as they are able to do so, out of the discussion. The example here is the war in Afghanistan. Week after week, Mr Gordon Brown rises at Prime Minister's Questions and pays tribute to the dead. Mr David Cameron responds with a few well-chosen words. Sometimes, indeed, Mr Cameron becomes even more eloquent than the Prime Minister in his tributes to the fallen. Whereas Mr Brown has redefined the war as an "insurgency", Mr Cameron tells us that our troops are fighting for freedom on the very back streets of Britain. Nor is Mr Nick Clegg far behind in tooting the trumpet. He did go so far as to wonder whether our boys would still be there in 30 years' time, in which case they would be grandfathers, if they were still alive. Mr Clegg did not make it wholly clear whether he welcomed their continuing presence in that inhospitable country or wanted them to be removed before then. No matter. The leader of the Liberal Democrats is content to remain part of the political consensus. How much longer can it go on? When the body bags began to come back from Vietnam, later commentators in Britain used the phrase as a metaphor for casualties. They may have meant it literally. But old military men pointed out that, in our wars, soldiers were buried where they had fallen, as sailors were at sea. In the past few years, certainly since the Iraq war, practice has changed. Casualties are returned, usually in a large transport aircraft, in a Union Jack-covered coffin, and buried with full military honours. And quite right too, if this helps the families. But these spectacles, shown more or less weekly on television, can do little to fortify the reputation of successive Labour governments. For some reason, enlightened opinion in this country has chosen to depict the war in Afghanistan as a good war - at any rate, a virtuous war - and the war in Iraq as bad. Opinion in the Labour Party is, as we know, a different matter. Labour supported the Iraq war, and luminaries such as Ms Harriet Harman and Mr Jon Cruddas, not to mention Mr Brown himself, should not be allowed to forget that support. I have the division lists at home to prove it. Labour had also supported the war in Afghanistan two years previously. Mr Tony Blair joined up as soon as Mr George Bush asked him. Indeed, Mr Blair was queuing up with sandwiches and a flask of coffee outside the front door of the recruiting office. The odd thing was that the representatives of enlightened opinion - the prig press, as much as Mr Rupert Murdoch's newspapers - seemed to be equally keen on what the Victorians used to call a punitive expedition. In fact the US administration clearly had something on an altogether larger scale in its mind. The conflict soon became wider. Indeed, the kidnapping of suspects and transporting them to Guantanamo Bay (or its predecessor) began in 2001 in Afghanistan rather than two years later in Iraq. I wrote here at the time that Mr Bush was acting out of pique, that the United States had suffered a grievous blow to its pride and that the President must be seen to be "doing something". The chosen course was to invade Afghanistan. The majority of the plotters of the outrage of 11 September 2001 came from Saudi Arabia, though they lived all over the place, including Germany. Pakistan was as fertile a ground for the production of terrorists as Afghanistan, as it still is, if not more so. And yet, the Western powers would not contemplate invading Pakistan, any more than they would think of laying a finger on the Saudis. In this country, the umpteenth Afghan war is being dressed up in the language of human rights, notably over the production of opium and the subjection of women. It is largely humbug. The United Kingdom became heavily involved in Afghanistan because Mr Bush asked us to become involved. That is the answer which Mr Brown, Mr Cameron or Mr Clegg should give when the curious voter asks: what are we doing in Afghanistan? Mr Clegg is pretty hopeless, I am afraid. I doubt whether we shall get much sense out of him in the immediate future. Mr Cameron is playing the patriotic card for all it is worth, which may be less than he imagines. Mr Brown is, through the medium of his lugubrious Defence Secretary, Mr Des Browne, actually increasing our strength in Afghanistan. Why not have a by-election on our presence in Afghanistan rather than on Mr David Davis's chosen subject? This is about the 42-day limit or, at its broadest, about civil liberties generally. These are undoubtedly important matters. But then, so is going to war. For seven years, the political parties, all the newspapers and most of the commentators, not including myself, have been supporters of the war in Afghanistan. Mr Davis presumably supports the war, which is why the by-election is no kind of test at all. Equally, however, Mr Davis's by-election as he has defined it is no test, either. He is at one with his party; he is still, I assume, an official candidate (even though it appears that the Conservatives are not supplying the funds); the other parties are not putting up candidates against him. Mr Davis's action does not make sense, not because he is losing place and prospects (though he may be losing those as well), but because the result of the contest does not prove anything one way or the other. This is the analysis of most politicians and political journalists, which I happen to share. But almost as soon as his decision was announced, Mr Davis began to receive messages of support: from public figures (including one from Mr Tony Benn), from people with electronic equipment at their disposal, not least, from columnists operating outside the sphere of politics. Why, there is even a possible libel action in the offing after Mr Andy Burnham, a Cabinet minister, accused Ms Shami Chakrabarti of Liberty of whispering sweet nothings into Mr Davis's ear about his forthcoming resignation. In fact, Ms Chakrabarti prudently advised Mr Davis to stay put. I should advise Ms Chakrabarti to see the funny side of life. And so we have a by-election where we have no candidates. We have a war which has been going on for seven years without troubling the political parties. And we have a Prime Minister who travelled to Brussels to receive the unanimous congratulations of his European colleagues for ratifying a treaty - subject to the decision of the High Court - without asking the voters any questions at all. Arsonists set fire to another school
http://www.quqnoos.com/ Seventh time a school in the province is set ablaze by unknown criminals ARSONISTS have set fire to a mixed boys and girls school in the Baraki Barak district of Logar province, officials say. The Shah Abulfatah secondary school was set alight on Friday after men tied the handsd and feet of the school's two guards, beat them up and poured petrol in the school's classrooms, the head of the province's education department said. Kamaluldin Zadran said about 900 boys and girls from 15 villages in the area study at the school. Zadran said the gunmen told the guards that the lives of the school's students and teachers would be in danger if the school re-opened. Despite the warning, about 40% of the students went back to their school after the attack, he said. A local security official, who refused to be named, said the blaze lasted for an hour until police arrived on the scene and put it out. Three weeks ago, arsonists set fire to a boys school in the Charkh district of Logar province. The attacks is the seventh of its kind in Logar since the start of the year. Stop killing the Taliban - they offer the best hope of beating Al-Qaeda
The Sunday Times The British expedition to Afghanistan is on the brink of something worse than defeat: a long, low-intensity war from which no government will dare to extricate itself. With the death toll mounting, battle is reportedly joined with the Taliban at the very gates of the second city, Kandahar. There is no justification for ministerial bombast that "we are winning the war, really". What is to be done? In 2001 the West waged a punitive retaliatory strike against the hosts of the perpetrators of 9/11. The strike has since followed every law of mission creep, now reduced in London to a great war of despair, in which the cabinet can do nothing but send even more men to their deaths. In seven years in Afghanistan, America, Britain and their Nato allies have made every mistake in the intervention book. They sent too few troops to assert an emphatic presence. They failed to "hit hard and get out", as advocated by Donald Rumsfeld, the American defence secretary. They tried to destroy the staple crop, poppies, and then let it go to warlords who now use it to finance suicide bombers, among others. They allowed a corrupt regime to establish itself in the capital, Kabul, while failing to promote honest administration in the provinces. They pretended that an international coalition (Nato) would be better than a unitary command (America), which it is not. They killed civilians and alienated tribes with crude air power. Finally, they disobeyed the iron law of postimperial intervention: don't stay too long. The British ambassador threatens "to stay for 30 years", rallying every nationalist to the insurgents' cause. The catalogue of western folly in Afghanistan is breathtaking. Britain went into Helmand two years ago on the basis of gung-ho, and gung-ho still censors public debate. Yet behind the scenes all is despair. A meeting of Afghan observers in London last week, at the launch of James Fergusson's book on the errors of Helmand, A Million Bullets, was an echo chamber of gloom. All hope was buried in a cascade of hypotheticals. Victory would be at hand "if only" the Afghan army were better, if the poppy crop were suppressed, the Pakistan border sealed, the Taliban leadership assassinated, corruption eradicated, hearts and minds won over. None of this is going to happen. The generals know it but the politicians dare not admit it. Those who still support the "good" Afghan war reply to any criticism by attempting to foreclose debate. They assert that we cannot be seen to surrender to the Taliban and we have gone in so far and must "finish the job". This is policy in denial. Nothing will improve without the support of the Afghan government, yet that support is waning by the month. Nothing will improve without the commitment of Pakistan. Yet two weeks ago Nato bombed Pakistani troops inside their own country, losing what lingering sympathy there is for America in an enraged Islamabad. Whoever ordered the attack ought to be court-martialled, except it was probably a computer. We forget that the objective of the Afghanistan incursion was not to build a new and democratic Afghanistan. It was to punish the Taliban for harbouring Osama Bin Laden and to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a haven for Al-Qaeda training camps. The former objective was achieved on day one; the latter would never be achieved by military occupation. A moment's thought would show that any invasion that replaced the Taliban with a western puppet in Kabul would merely restore the Taliban as champions of Afghan sovereignty. The Americans sponsored them to be just such a puppet in the 1980s, funding some 60,000 foreign mercenaries to join them against the Russians. Intervention reaps what it sows. Two things were known about the Taliban at the time and they are probably still true. First, under outside pressure their leaders were moving from the manic extremism of their "student" origins, even responding to demands to curb the poppy harvest. The present Nato policy of killing the older leaders and thus leaving young hotheads in charge is daft. Second, the Pashtun Taliban are not natural friends of the Arab Al-Qaeda, despite Bin Laden being given sanctuary by the Taliban's Mullah Omar. Bin Laden helped the Taliban by murdering Ahmed Shah Massoud, the Tajik leader, but that put a Tajik price on his head, which no man wants. Then the 9/11 coup made the Taliban pariahs even within the region. I have yet to find reason to doubt the Afghan experts who predicted in the aftermath of 9/11 that Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda had become "unwelcome guests" in 2001 and that his days in Afghanistan, and probably on earth, were numbered. Seven recent books on relations between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban discussed in the current edition of The New York Review of Books scream one policy message: do not drive Al-Qaeda, set on crazy world domination, into the arms of the Taliban, set only on Pashtun nationalism. Do everything to separate them. Western strategy has done the precise opposite. The only policy that meets the original objective is one that supports anyone in the insurgent areas with sufficient authority to deny sanctuary to international terrorists. There is now plainly no way that Nato can do this. There is much murmuring among realists that "we" should talk to the Taliban, as if we were Her Majesty's Government dealing with the IRA. The parallel is absurd. American special forces and Anglo-Canadian units in Afghanistan are, as they jokingly admit, rather like Taliban mercenaries, who snatch and hold towns for a while but are unable to command local loyalty. They cannot hope to garrison every settlement. Hamid Karzai, the outgoing Afghan president, is the only one who can talk. He is no fool and has been attempting to do what Kabul rulers have always done: cut deals with whichever provincial commanders appear to control territory and can forge alliances with local Taliban or whoever. That may not be the grand strategy beloved of western think tanks, but it is the realpolitik of Afghanistan. The same realpolitik applies to the other player in the game, Pakistan, whose civilian rulers are trying to contain an army of doubtful loyalty and seek peace in tribal areas way beyond their control. Here Al-Qaeda has again forged a lethal alliance with the Taliban, drawing on an inexhaustible supply of young militants from Pakistan and abroad, as in the 1980s. The best policy would be to hurl money at Pakistan's impoverished non-madrasah schools, rather than starve them and pour 80% of aid into a corrupt Pakistan army. The Taliban's chief objective is not world domination but a share of power in Afghanistan. While they cannot defeat western troops, they can defeat Nato's war aim by continuing to build on their marriage of convenience with Al-Qaeda, which supplies them with a devastating arsenal of suicide bombers. What is sure is that Al-Qaeda, as a (grossly overrated) "threat to the West", will not be suppressed without Taliban cooperation. This means reversing a policy that naively equates "defeating" the Taliban with "winning" the war on terror. Fighting in Afghanistan is as senseless as trying to suppress the poppy crop. It just costs lives and money. While it is implausible for the West to withdraw from Kabul at present, the attempt to establish military control over provincial Afghanistan is merely jeopardising the war aim. Security within the country now depends on fashioning the patchwork of alliances sought, however corruptly, by Karzai. It means dealing with reality, not trying to change it with guns and bombs. It therefore makes sense to withdraw soldiers from the provinces and forget "nation-building" in the hope that Karzai can exert some leverage over local commanders to separate the Taliban from the Al-Qaeda cells in Pakistan. This is a race against the most appalling strategic catastrophe, a political collapse in Pakistan that may open a new and horrific front involving Al-Qaeda. It is madness to prolong an Afghan war that can only undermine the most unstable nuclear power in the world, Pakistan. The war is visiting misery on millions and destroying western interests across central Asia. As for the claim made in parliament last week that the war is about safety on Britain's streets, that is ludicrous. Marines' 'victory' comes at high cost for Afghans
Gulf Today - Business To hear the military tell it, its recent large-scale operation in the southern province of Helmand by a US Marine force was an unqualified success, driving Taliban insurgents from the restive region and restoring hope and confidence to villagers through the region. The Marines "have disrupted the Taliban's freedom of movement and pushed them south, and that has created the grounds for us to develop the hospital and set the conditions for the government to come back," said Maj. Neil Den-McKay, the officer commanding a company of the Royal Regiment of Scotland based here. People have already started coming back to villages north of the town, he said, adding, "There has been huge optimism from the people." But reporters on the ground found a very different story. This once bustling district is now a ghost town, with villages largely emptied of their populations. In the village of Loy Kalai alone, 4,000 families fled once the Marines' offensive started. More than half the houses were destroyed. Abandoned farm animals are beginning to die in the fields. The body of a man who appeared to have died from shrapnel wounds could be seen in one abandoned house. The smell of decay hung over the area. "I could not believe what I was seeing," said a resident who asked that his name not be used. The Garmsir district has been the focus of a large-scale Nato operation code-named "Azada Wosa" ("Be Free" in Pashto). The offensive, led by the 2,400-member strong US Marine Expeditionary Unit, began in the spring. Garmsir is strategically located about 40 miles south of Helmand's capital, Lashkar Gah, and is an important transit route for insurgents coming in from Pakistan. The district also serves as a major hub for smuggling opium paste and heroin out of poppy-rich Helmand. "This was a very successful operation," Nato spokesman Brig. Gen. Carlos Branco said during a telephone interview late last month. "Only one US Marine was killed and four injured -- two non-battle-related." He reiterated ISAF's policy of not releasing casualty figures of Taliban, but added, "The Taliban are suffering huge losses. They are reinforcing the area in a very disorganised way." Branco also dismissed claims that there were a large number of civilian casualties. "I am not saying there were none, only that we have no reports." He added that such reports that had appeared in the Afghan media were "highly exaggerated." "Our figures show 4,000 displaced persons, most of them from before the operation started," he said. Local officials and residents, however, tell a very different story. According to Helmand Gov. Gulab Mangal, the fighting has displaced 8,000 families, most of whom are in urgent need of assistance. Aid being provided by the United Nations in the area "cannot meet the needs of the people," he said. Many of the civilians who had fled the area told of numerous civilian casualties. One man, who fled the area and asked that his name not be used, said he witnessed several women and children killed in the offensive. "I saw two (Toyota minivans) full of women and children who were trying to get away," he said. "The cars were bombed and completely destroyed. I cannot say how many were killed because we ran and hid, but we could see the fire and smoke coming out of them." Abdul Karim, who had fled to the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah from a village in Garmsir, said four people were killed when a bomb struck his neighbour's house. "Almost everyone in Garmsir is leaving for either Pakistan or Lashkar Gah," he said. "Those who don't have money are just stuck in the desert." In Helmand's deserts, where temperatures often reach more than 120 degrees, thousands of people are reported to be without shelter, food, or adequate drinking water. Asadullah Mayar, head of the Red Crescent Society of Helmand province, said his organisation was doing the best it could under difficult conditions. "The displaced people are in a very bad state," he said. "They are not being helped. Last week we helped 280 families with tea, flour, oil and blankets. We have prepared assistance for an additional 700 families. But there are many more." Mayar concurred with the provincial governor's estimate that about 8,000 families had fled their homes to other districts or desert areas. "We will try and help them as soon as we can determine where they have gone," he said. Garmsir has been long been a hotly contested area, serving as a key transit point for non-Afghan forces to enter the country to join their Taliban allies. "Before the beginning of this operation, there were 500 foreign fighters in Garmsir," said Mangal, the provincial governor. "Now the number has increased to 1,100, and more are coming every day." US and Nato forces have relied heavily on air strikes to dislodge Taliban forces, but it's often the civilian population that bears the brunt of the assault. Sher Agha, a resident of Garmsir, described scenes of chaos during the attacks. "I saw old men, women, children, just running, trying to save themselves," he said. "No one looked out for their children, their parents. It was everyone for himself." But Nato's Branco described the operation as carefully planned and restrained. He insisted that there were no reports of civilian casualties "despite the intensity of the operations." A US military official went so far as to claim that local residents support the Marines' efforts. "The Afghan citizens hold the insurgents responsible for the hardship they impose," said Col. Peter Petronzio, commanding officer of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit. "The only criticism the Marines have received is that they are moving too slowly." Nato's Branco promised that better days were ahead for the region. "Naturally, we regret any families who have left their homes, but once we have re-established Afghan government control they will return and will enjoy a better quality of life, free from the oppressive regime of the Taliban," he said. That's a promise that many residents have heard before. Back in September 2006, an operation led by international forces and the Afghan National Army reported clearing Garmsir of insurgents during an operation that lasted eight hours. In 2007, foreign forces launched yet another operation in the region. By April of that year, Nato was issuing press releases insisting that the Taliban had been driven out and that "in districts such as Lashkar Gah, Naw Zad and Garmsir, local Afghans have started seeing the benefit of a safer environment." Now Nato, along with the Marine forces, is again claiming success. "This is the 20th time I've heard there are military operations in Helmand," said Faruq Dawer, deputy director of the Civil Rights Organisation for Afghanistan, a local non-governmental organisation. "When the Taliban go to a village, they don't usually stay for a long time. Then the Americans come in and launch a military operation, counting civilian casualties as their military achievement," he said. "When they leave the area, the Taliban come back in. This doesn't make any sense -- you cannot stabilise the area this way." Dawer warns that such large-scale military operations are actually making the situation in Helmand province worse. "Civilian casualties are the reason security is getting worse," he said. "The relatives of those killed join the ranks of the enemy to exact revenge." And it's not just Nato and US forces that have a hard time distinguishing between the civilian population and Taliban fighters, Dawer said. Because a large portion of the Afghan army is made up of recruits from the northern part of the country, many are unfamiliar with the overwhelmingly Pashtun south. "For a non-Pashtun, all these turbaned people look like Taliban," said Dawer. "But almost everyone wears a turban down there. "This is the fourth week of the operation. But even if it goes on for four years, it will not have any result," he said. Nato and Marine leaders insist that this time they'll get it right. "There is no set end-date for the operation in Garmsir. Marines will stay until the mission has been accomplished," said Capt. Kelly Frushour, the public affairs officer of the 24th Expeditionary Force. "And even though the Marines are not in Garmsir permanently, Nato and its forces remain committed to the mission there." MCT Paying off a debt with a daughter
BBC News The ban on poppy farming in Afghanistan may hamper the heroin trade but it also leaves farmers in poverty. Kate Clark meets one who has had to negotiate the betrothal of his six-year-old daughter to pay a debt. Jalalabad, near the junction of the Kabul and Kunar rivers, is a green city, shaded by citrus and pine trees. In spring, the air is sweet with the fragrance of orange blossom. Farmers who live nearby on the well-watered land are weathering the government ban on opium poppy. Further away in the mountainous, outlying districts, the ban is hitting home hard. The ban has made the province restive, too dangerous for me to travel through. Growing poverty So with a heavy heart, because I would much rather get out to the villages and sit on the floor, talking to people over tea, I have arranged for farmers to travel in to Jalalabad to see me. Three times since 2000, a ban on poppy growing has been enforced in Nangarhar province. Cultivation has always bounced back. But each time, the poorest farmers were left poorer and less able to cope. One man, Juma Khan [not his real name] has come down from his village in the mountains on the Pakistan border. Turbaned, with a white beard and a deeply lined face, he looks old enough to be a grandfather. Selling his daughter But he has just agreed to hand over his six-year-old daughter to pay off a debt. She is now engaged to the creditor's son. In a country without banks, opium is the standard way to get a loan. You borrow opium and pay back with opium. While Juma Khan was growing poppies, he could pay off the interest on the debt, although never the capital. The ban means he is having to grow low-value wheat. This year, he will not even be able to feed his family. And because he is landless, his only asset is his female children. He has already exchanged two daughters for debt and now the youngest has wiped off a further £1,000 ($2,000) worth, a huge amount of money in rural Afghanistan. A father here gets paid by the family of the groom, so payment of money is normal at a marriage. Heroin trade The shame for Juma Khan is that he has been forced to marry off his daughter. Weaning Afghanistan off poppy cultivation must be good, you would think. Afghan opium, processed into heroin, causes the deaths of tens of thousands of people around the world each year. It is funding the Taleban insurgency and feeding government corruption. Afghans usually recognise that it is a haram crop, forbidden in Islam, but if your family is facing hunger, they say, even haram crops become acceptable. Low risk crop And here, the poppy has always been regarded as wonderful. In a high risk environment, it is a low risk crop. It suits the dry climate. And even when there is war, there is always a market for opium. And if you grow poppies, you can always get credit. The farmers range from big landowners to subsistence peasants. The really big profits, though, go to the traffickers, the corrupt officials, and in the south, to the Taleban who take a religious tax on the harvest. 'Better than aid' Even so, there is a real trickle down of cash. Poppy is a labour intensive crop, so even landless labourers get some small share of the profits. It is more effective than aid at reaching the poor, one development worker told me. This year in Nangarhar, growing poppies is not an option. In Juma Khan's district, farmers have been arrested for breaking the ban. It has become very tough for many families. Tribal threats Some men spoke about joining the Taleban to make money, they pay their fighters £70 ($140) a month, or the Afghan National Army who pay rather less. Many farmers literally do not know how they are going to feed their families. They are feeling angry and betrayed. They said the government had promised aid to help them through the ban, but they have received nothing. Some threatened to break the ban next year. "Our tribe is the Khogiani," said one farmer, "and we're brave like lions, a big tribe, living on the border with Pakistan." "The government should look after poor families," he said. And they should watch out. Afghan kings have been brought down by the tribes of Nangarhar. But the man whose small daughter is now engaged, looks exhausted. His fighting days are long gone. He went into debt during the jihad against the invading Soviet army, 30 years ago. Since then, he has never managed to pay back the capital. No shame Did he not feel any shame, I asked, about marrying off his six-year-old? No, he said, the real shame would have been to have his creditors knocking at his door, embarrassing him in front of the village. Your daughter, I persisted, how does she feel? "Oh, she's happy to be solving her father's problems," he said. He cannot stay for long. He needs to get back home to water his fields. The wheat crop, he said, even though it will only be enough to feed his family for a couple of months, cannot be neglected. Afghanistan's deadly double whammy
The Age, Australia WHAM. It's an unfortunately violent acronym, given that it covers the softer side of what Australian troops are doing in southern Afghanistan. It stands for "winning hearts and minds", and it refers to development and reconstruction projects designed to undermine support for the Taliban, win the trust of local people and spread the influence of the Afghan Government. It's the reverse side of the counter-insurgency coin - involving what the military calls "non-kinetic" actions, unlike "kinetic" actions, such as killing insurgents. The phrase WHAM was coined by the Americans in Vietnam, but the concept failed there, for many reasons, including the fact it was undermined by kinetic traditionalists who argued that if you grabbed the enemy by more sensitive parts of his anatomy, his heart and mind would follow. Afghanistan, of course, is not Vietnam, but there are disconcerting parallels. In both cases, foreign troops were sent to support a government facing an insurgency. In Vietnam, it was the anti-communist government in Saigon. In Afghanistan, it's the government of President Hamid Karzai. Like the Saigon government, Karzai's administration is unable or unwilling to fill the breathing space that military operations are meant to create, with development, clean governance and security. The Saigon government was massively corrupt. So is Karzai's. Karzai's failures create dilemmas for foreign forces supporting him: how do you win hearts and minds in a war in support of his government, when resentment of that government's failings fuels the insurgency? These failures leave ordinary Afghans in an appalling predicament, caught between vicious insurgents, on one hand, and the corrupt, inefficient and often brutal security forces of the government. The predicament was summed up by a tribal elder interviewed by foreign aid agencies for a study reported in today's Sunday Age. "If I could move around freely," he said, "and not be bothered by the Taliban any more at night and by the government during the day, that would be security." The study stresses Afghan views of foreign troops are far from uniform. Many believe a sudden withdrawal would make their lives worse, and see the troops as the lesser of two evils. "Frankly speaking," an Afghan journalist said, "people hate the government presence, in particular the ANP (the Afghan National Police), more than the international forces." The study's findings are reinforced by a recent article in the Australian Army Journal by Colonel John Frewen, who served in Afghanistan last year. He says Afghans regard foreign troops as "a force for good and an agent of progress", that success is possible and abandoning Afghanistan would be "callous and irresponsible". But unless there is rapid development of the justice sector - effective police, judges, courts, lawyers and prisons - military forces will be left to "a repetitious treadmill of killing and capturing insurgents then waiting for more to take their place". Soldiers, Frewen says, call this "mowing the grass". While the Taliban are brutal and offer the people nothing, they "do not carry the same stigma of endemic corruption as that of the current Afghan Government". As a result, the Taliban win passive support "because there is no other way to voice political opposition" to a government that is "increasingly despised". Frewen writes: "Regrettably, the average person's experience of central government is wholly unsatisfactory. Afghans regularly face corruption such as the extortion of money at police checkpoints or by petty bureaucrats during administrative dealings. "The drug lords have a strong culture of impunity. The population cannot help but feel bitter and helpless when their governor, their judges and their police chiefs are complicit." The only option for the West, he says, is to stay the course, take a strong stand against corruption and understand a lasting solution will take decades. Frewen says you can't influence Afghans without looking them in the eye. "Nor can you convince Afghans that their long-term security and prosperity is best served by a government propped up by foreign forces if military contributions are annually reviewed and life-enhancing development is not forthcoming." Frewen's words prompt a few questions for Kevin Rudd, who says Australia's contribution will be subjected to a "rolling annual review". If Frewen is correct, Rudd's words will hardly reassure ordinary Afghans. Rudd says he wouldn't have troops in Afghanistan if he didn't believe there was a strategy for victory. Without giving away any secrets, can he give us an idea what that strategy is? And he says Australia is committed to Afghanistan for "the long haul". How long is a long haul? Tom Hyland is The Sunday Age international editor.
The News - International, Pakistan The rise in militancy in the Northern Areas, the never-imagined-before suicide bombings in the heart of our cities and the threats of attack on our western borders by Afghanistan should not come as a surprise to anyone. Since the beginning of Pakistan's involvement in this so-called war on terror, Pervez Musharraf's over-eagerness to buddy up to President Bush was foretold to have damning effects for Pakistan. What started with the rhetoric of Pakistan and America being "coalition partners" to make this world a safer place has but been an excuse for brazen violations of Pakistani airspace and unauthorised American incursions on our land, resulting in the spilling of Pakistani blood on Pakistani soil, soldiers and civilians alike. The attack on Pakistani troops in Mohmand Agency by the American forces from across the border in Afghanistan marks the beginning of an uneasy chapter in the two countries' relationship. The unjustified attack by America has notched up anti-American sentiments to an unprecedented high and is pressuring our government to say "enough!" to the US. However, while the anger and resentment is building against American operations in Pakistan, Washington is showing no signs of comprehending these sentiments. The cracks in the relationship are beginning to show, now more than ever. It is becoming increasingly apparent that America and Pakistan are failing to see eye to eye on many critical strategic matters on how to conduct this war. While Pakistan is increasingly proffering reasons to choose dialogue over military operation in dealing with the militants, America, with its fetish for warfare, seems to have stepped up its military operations, to the point where it matters little if in the process it is overriding the sovereignty of its most important ally, or even killing its people. The attack on Mohmand agency is ominous in terms of what lies ahead for Pakistan and the string of developments following this attack bode ill for Pakistan's future. First, there is the rather belligerent Hamid Karzai, who is said to be acting upon America's nod and threatening to send Afghan soldiers across the border into Pakistan in order to fight militants. While Karzai may be justified in urging Pakistan to act against those elements that are making Pakistan and Afghanistan insecure, his comments are just one aspect of the overall American strategy to escalate military operation in, and consequently against, Pakistan. Then, there is news that in his recent trip to England Bush has convinced the English premier to increase his infantry in Afghanistan and "enlist British special forces in a final attempt to capture Osama bin Laden before he leaves the White House." Probably basing its strategy on the belief that Osama bin Laden is hiding in the Bajaur tribal zone in northwest Pakistan, the Pentagon feels that in order to blow Osama's cover, "we [America] just need to occupy Pakistan's tribal territory to stop its Pakhtoon tribes from supporting and sheltering the Taliban." Unfortunately, America's myopic vision does not allow it to see that such action will not only enrage Pakistanis across the country but might also make the pro-Taliban Pakhtoons' retreat deeper into the country and seek refuge in the cities, taking the entire country in their grip, killing thousands of civilians and creating a warlike state. In such a situation it might become inevitable for the Pakistani Army to clash directly with the American forces. As Bush revs up for that winning dunk before his time is up, that last great sixer which will embellish his legacy forever, Pakistan is for the first time seriously entering into political dialogue with the same Pakhtoon tribes the Americans are attacking. Reportedly, the US is "prepping for a major battle" as Bush is running out of time and is restless to win Osama's head; Pakistan, on the other hand is proposing a policy of social reform and political discourse in order to win the trust and cooperation of the tribals. This may require time and patience, but is slated to yield better results than what we have after eight years of aggression in the name of finding peace Unfortunately, America still fails to see how counter-productive and futile its "war on terror" has been. Today, the world has more terrorist and suicide bombers than there were at the time this war began. The death of innocent civilians and tribesmen in Pakistan by US attacks have only served to stoke anti-US sentiments amongst the tribals and ignite their zeal to defend their own people, even if that means siding with the Taliban. The bombs dropped upon villages and the Hellfire missiles attacks by the Predators or Reapers may be successful in killing some militants, but they also kill and displace many civilians. While these raids might eliminate some militants and "terrorists," they birth many more such terrorists and suicide bombers seeking to avenge American aggression. The time has come for Pakistan to set some clear boundaries for the US and redefine the terms of its cooperation. It is important for the present government to display a clear shift from the policies of the Musharraf regime and devise a working relationship with the US which would not compromise the sovereignty of the country. Change in government in both countries brings hope and provides us with an opportunity to break away from, the "tried and failed" policies of the Bush and Musharraf regimes and tackle the situation from a fresh new perspective. The time has come for the new governments to write a new chapter in the history of Pakistani-US relations. And the time has come for the Americans to salvage whatever little the Bush administration will leave behind in terms of trust and mutual respect between the two countries. While Obama is clearly the more transformational candidate, one hopes that both the White House candidates will represent a change over Bush. However, Pakistan must be wary that with the ushering in of the new government and the likelihood of a Democrat win, a sudden and unplanned roll back of US from the region does not leave Pakistan high and dry to clear up behind them. We must remind ourselves of the time when the State Department and the CIA ended cooperation and vacated Afghanistan without a proper exit strategy to facilitate the country to resettle and Pakistan was left bear the brunt of refugees, drugs and Kalashnikovs. The recent US Supreme Court judgment on Guantanamo Bay reflects that America is conscious of the ills of Bush's policies and acknowledges that they were unethical, devoid of human rights considerations and political etiquettes. Pakistan must seize this opportunity and appeal to this consciousness that the Bush philosophy on war on terror is inherently flawed and in the long run has cultivated terrorism rather than curbing it. The writer is a barrister and human rights activist currently based in the UAE. Email: This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it Now That We've ‘Won,' Let's Come Home
New York Times, United States THE Iraq war's defenders like to bash the press for pushing the bad news and ignoring the good. Maybe they'll be happy to hear that the bad news doesn't rate anymore. When a bomb killed at least 51 Iraqis at a Baghdad market on Tuesday, ending an extended run of relative calm, only one of the three network newscasts (NBC's) even bothered to mention it. The only problem is that no news from Iraq isn't good news - it's no news. The night of the Baghdad bombing the CBS war correspondent Lara Logan appeared as Jon Stewart's guest on "The Daily Show" to lament the vanishing television coverage and the even steeper falloff in viewer interest. "Tell me the last time you saw the body of a dead American soldier," she said. After pointing out that more soldiers died in Afghanistan than Iraq last month, she asked, "Who's paying attention to that?" Her question was rhetorical, but there is an answer: Virtually no one. If you follow the nation's op-ed pages and the presidential campaign, Iraq seems as contentious an issue as Vietnam was in 1968. But in the country itself, Cindy vs. Michelle, not Shiites vs. Sunnis, is the hotter battle. This isn't the press's fault, and it isn't the public's fault. It's merely the way things are. In America, the war has been a settled issue since early 2007. No matter what has happened in Iraq since then, no matter what anyone on any side of the Iraq debate has had to say about it, polls have consistently found that a majority of Americans judge the war a mistake and want out. For that majority, the war is over except for finalizing the withdrawal details. They've moved on without waiting for the results of Election Day 2008 or sampling the latest hectoring ad from moveon.org. Perhaps if Americans had been asked for shared sacrifice at the war's inception, including a draft, they would be in 1968-ish turmoil now. But they weren't, and they aren't. In 2008, the Vietnam analogy doesn't hold. The center does. The good news for Democrats - and the big opportunity for Barack Obama - is that John McCain and the war's last cheerleaders don't recognize that immutable reality. They're so barricaded in their own Vietnam bunker that they think the country is too. It's their constant and often shrill refrain that if only those peacenik McGovern Democrats and the "liberal media" acknowledged that violence is down in Iraq - as indeed it is, substantially - voters will want to press on to "victory" and not "surrender." And therefore go for Mr. McCain. One neocon pundit, Charles Krauthammer, summed up this alternative-reality mind-set in a recent column piously commanding Mr. McCain to "make the election about Iraq" because "everything is changed," and "we are winning on every front." The war, he wrote, can be "the central winning plank of his campaign." (Italics his.) This hyperventilating wasn't necessary, because this is what Mr. McCain is already trying to do. His first general election ad, boosted by a large media buy in swing states this month, was all about war. It invoked his Vietnam heroism and tried to have it both ways on Iraq by at once presenting Mr. McCain as a stay-the-course warrior and taking a (timid) swipe at President Bush. "Only a fool or a fraud talks tough or romantically about war," Mr. McCain said in his voice-over. That unnamed fool would be our cowboy president, who in March told American troops how he envied their "in some ways romantic" task of "confronting danger." But reminding voters of his identification with Iraq, no matter how he spins it, pays no political dividends to Mr. McCain. People just don't want to hear about it. Last week, the first polls conducted in Pennsylvania and Ohio since the ad began running there found him well behind in both states. The G.O.P.'s badgering of Mr. Obama about the war is also backfiring. In sync with Mr. McCain, the Republican National Committee unveiled an online clock - "Track How Long Since Obama Was in Iraq!" - only to have Mr. Obama call the bluff by announcing that he will go to both Afghanistan and Iraq before the election. Unless he takes along his own Lieberman-like Jiminy Cricket to whisper factual corrections into his ear, this trip is likely to enhance his stature as a potential commander in chief. The other whiny line of G.O.P.-McCain attack is to demand incessantly that Mr. Obama stop refusing to recognize the decline in violence in Iraq, stop calling for a hasty troop withdrawal and stop ignoring commanders on the ground in assessing his exit strategy. Here, too, Mr. Obama is calling their bluff, though not nearly as loudly as he will, I suspect, in the debates. The fact is that Mr. Obama frequently recognizes "the reduction of violence in Iraq" (his words) and has said he is "encouraged" by it. He has never said that he would refuse to consult with commanders on the ground, and he has never called for a precipitous withdrawal. His mantra on Iraq, to the point of tedium, has always been that "we must be as careful getting out as we were careless getting in." His roughly 16-month timetable isn't hasty and isn't "retreat." As The Economist, a supporter of the war, recently put it, a safer Iraq does not necessarily validate Mr. McCain's "insistence on America staying indefinitely" and might make Mr. Obama's 16-month framework "more feasible." After all, the point of the surge, as laid out by Mr. Bush, was to buy time for political reconciliation among the Iraqis. The results have been at best spotty, and even the crucial de-Baathification law celebrated by Mr. Bush and Mr. McCain in January remains inoperative. Mr. Obama's timetable is at least an effort to use any remaining American leverage to concentrate the Iraqi leaders' thinking. Mr. McCain offers only the status quo: a blank check holding America hostage to fate and ceding the president's civilian authority over war policy to Gen. David Petraeus and his successors. Should voters tune in, they'll also discover that the McCain policy is nonsensical on its face. If "we are winning" and the surge is a "success," then what is the rationale for keeping American forces bogged down there while the Taliban regroups ominously in Afghanistan? Why, if this is victory, does Mr. McCain keep threatening that "chaos and genocide" will follow our departure? And why should we take the word of a prophet who failed to anticipate the chaos and ethnic cleansing that would greet our occupation? And exactly how, as Mr. McCain keeps claiming, is an indefinite American occupation akin to our long-term military role in South Korea? The diminution of violence notwithstanding, Iraq is an active war zone. And unlike South Korea, it isn't asking America to remain to protect it from a threatening neighbor. Iraq's most malevolent neighbor, Iran, is arguably Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's closest ally. In the most recent survey, in February, only 27 percent of Iraqis said the American presence is improving their country's security. Far from begging us to stay, some Iraqi politicians, including Mr. Maliki, have been pandering to their own election-year voters by threatening to throw the Yankees out. Mr. McCain's sorest Achilles' heel, of course, is his role in facilitating the fiasco in the first place. Someone in his campaign has figured this out. Go to JohnMcCain.com and, hilariously enough, you'll find a "McCain on Iraq Timeline" that conveniently begins in August 2003, months after "Mission Accomplished." Vanished into the memory hole are such earlier examples of the McCain Iraq wisdom as "the end is very much in sight" (April 9, 2003) and "there's not a history of clashes that are violent between Sunnis and Shiites" (later that same month). To finesse this embarrassing record, Mr. McCain asks us to believe that the only judgment that matters is who was "right" about the surge, not who was right about our reckless plunge into war. That's like saying he deserves credit for tossing life preservers to the survivors after encouraging the captain of the Titanic to plow full speed ahead into the iceberg. But as Lara Logan asked, who's paying attention to any of this Iraq stuff anyway? That Mr. McCain makes an unpopular and half-forgotten war the centerpiece of his campaign may simply be a default posture - the legacy of his Vietnam service and a recognition that any war, good or bad, is still a stronger suit for him than delving into the details of health care, education, tax policy or the mortgage crisis. Even so, it leaves him trapped in a Catch-22. If violence continues to subside in Iraq - if, as Mr. McCain has it, we keep "winning" - it will only call more attention to the internal contradictions of a policy that says success in Iraq should be punished by forcing American troops to stay there indefinitely. And if Iraq reignites, well, so much for "winning." Not that the Obama policy is foolproof either. As everyone knows, there are no good options in Iraq. Our best hope for a bipartisan resolution of this disaster may be for a President Obama to appoint Mr. McCain as a special envoy to Baghdad, where he can stay for as long as he needs to administer our withdrawal or 100 years, whichever comes first. Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Denying the Durand Line
Pacific Free Press, Canada The Durand Line exists in international law. It exists on paper. The c.40 million people, 15 million on the Pakistan side, 25 on the Afghan, do not recognize this arbitrary line drawn by a foreigner in 1893 that makes them citizens of one country or another. They are all Pashtuns speaking a common language and living by their ancient honour code: Pashtunwali. This weekend President Karzai threatened to send his troops into Pakistan. Not surprisingly US backs Afghan hot pursuit into Pak. The U.S. has been attacking across the Line, last week killing eleven Pakistani soldiers. On Sunday there was a confirmed report that 2 US helicopters violate Pakistani airspace and that a US missile strike kills one in S Waziristan, not yet confirmed. Whether it be the President's Get Osama Bin Laden before I leave office,or the Pentagon's insistence that "We just need to occupy Pakistan's tribal territory" to stop its Pashtun tribes from supporting and sheltering Taliban," which Eric Margolis, the author of A line not to be crossed considers a driving force behind Karzai's threat, it increases the potential of an attack. "Widening the Afghan War into Pakistan is military stupidity on a grand scale, and political madness. But Washington and its obedient allies seem hell-bent on charging into a wider regional war that no number of heavy bombers will win" are the author's closing words. Pakistan not keeping Taliban out, MacKay says, and he is correct. It cannot, for the Pashtuns are no more controlled by the Pakistani than they were by the British in the past or the Soviets in recent years. Rather than saying: "We have to call for calm at this time and that means speaking with President Karzai as well as officials inside Pakistan," Canada's Defence Minister would be better advised to argue against what Pakistanis (whatever their government's response is) will consider an invasion. Will this occur? Probably not for in such matters Canada to-day is, in this as in other matters, one of Washington's "obedient allies."
HUMANITARIAN
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